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Abstract: “Theory of mind” (ToM) has been described as the ability to attribute and understand other people’s desires 
and intentions as distinct from one’s own. There has been a debate about the extent to which language influences ToM 
development. Although very few studies directly examined linguistic influence on the neural basis of ToM, results from 
these studies indicate at least moderate influence of language on ToM. In this review both behavioral and neurological 
studies that examined the relationship between language and ToM are selectively discussed. This review focuses on cross-
linguistic / cultural studies (especially Japanese vs. American / English) since my colleagues and I found evidence of 
significant linguistic influence on the neural basis of ToM through a series of functional brain imaging experiments. 
Evidence from both behavioral and neurological studies of ToM (including ours) suggests that the pragmatic (not the 
constitutive) aspects of language influence ToM understanding more significantly. 
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INTRODUCTION 
  Theory of mind (ToM) – our ability to understand the 
underlying mental states of other people – is a fundamental 
human capacity for communication and social activity across 
different language systems. ToM has been tested in typically 
and atypically developing children with a variety of 
paradigms. Among them, a false-belief task is the most 
commonly used [1]. In a typical false-belief task, dubbed the 
“Sally-Anne” task, a toy is moved by a protagonist, Anne, 
while another protagonist, Sally, is absent, so that Sally 
mistakenly believes the object is still in its last location, 
while the all-seeing Anne knows it is now somewhere else. 
Children are asked, when Sally comes back where she will 
look for the toy [2, 3]. A large volume of research across 
different language systems indicates that ToM develops 
sometime between 2.5 and 5 years of age in typically 
developing children [4]. However, false-belief acquisition 
lags behind significantly in children with autism spectrum 
disorders (ASD) [5, 6] and other atypical developmental 
conditions including specific language impairment [7] and 
deafness [8,9].  
  It has long been debated whether or not a person has to 
have sophisticated language skill in order to have ToM 
capacity. Some argued that mindreading / ToM precedes 
language in development (e.g., [10-13]), while others posited 
that language development is a necessary precursor for ToM 
reasoning (see refs. below). For instance, Fodor [10] argued 
that humans possess a rich, propositional representational 
system which we share with non-human primates, and which 
is different from natural language. However, across many 
studies, significant relations between language ability and   
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children’s performance on false-belief tasks have been found 
in both typically [14-16] and atypically developing children / 
adolescents [5-7]. De Villiers and her colleagues argued that 
people need sophisticated grammar, especially ability to 
understand the complement embedded in the false-belief 
sentences to develop ToM (e.g., [17]). A recent meta-
analysis of more than a hundred studies that examined the 
relationship between language and ToM supported this so-
called “linguistic determinism” hypothesis of de Villiers and 
her colleagues because they found significant correlation 
between ToM and syntactic and semantic language measures 
used in these studies [18]. However, the meta-analysis was 
limited in that it failed to delineate the causal directions 
involved in the relationship and the applicability of the 
relationship across different language systems since the 
analysis excluded studies on non-English speaking 
populations. It was also limited in that it did not take into 
account possible effects of pragmatic aspects of language on 
ToM. This is a major limitation of the meta-analysis given 
the increasing evidence that at least in people with ASD, 
pragmatics (not syntax or semantics) largely account for 
their impairment in ToM [19, 20].  
  Neurological evidence for or against linguistic 
determinism is still in its infancy. An aphasic patient with a 
wide left-hemispheric damage showed intact ToM 
performance while failing syntax-related tasks [21]. Also, it 
has been found that processing of pragmatically coherent 
sentences alone (without ToM) activates the medial 
prefrontal cortex (mPFC) [22] that has been most 
consistently implicated in brain imaging studies of ToM 
[23]. Recently, through a series of functional brain imaging 
experiments in Japanese and American / English speaking 
adults and children, my colleagues and I demonstrated that 
ToM is subserved by different areas of the brain depending 
on the language used in the task [24, 25]. However, at least 
the differences in brain activity when the participants viewed 
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Japanese and the same cartoon-based false-belief task may 
reflect non-syntactic / -semantic aspects of language. These 
results suggest that constitutive aspects of language (e.g., 
grammar) may function merely as a “co-opted” system (see 
[26]), but pragmatic aspects of language (e.g., mode / 
attitude and reading communicative intentions) may 
profoundly affect ToM throughout development. 
  This article aims to review; 1) results of behavioral 
studies that examined the relationship between language and 
ToM, 2) results of neurological case studies and functional 
brain imaging studies that examined this relationship. This 
review particularly focuses on results from a series of cross-
linguistic functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
experiments on neural basis of ToM that my colleagues and I 
reported [24, 25]. Finally, I discuss current limitations and 
future directions of research of the relationship between 
language and ToM. 
EVIDENCE FROM BEHAVIORAL STUDIES 
ToM in Preverbal Infants 
  If language is necessary for ToM, it follows that 
preverbal infants do not understand ToM. Several recent 
studies in infants showed that it is not the case. It has been 
shown that precursor ability (e.g., joint attention, imitation 
and pointing gestures) of ToM is present early in infancy 
(e.g., [27-29]). A series of recent studies that used looking-
preference paradigms found that even 13-15 month-old 
infants have the capacity to understand ToM [29-31]. Even 
though these results and methods used in the false-belief 
experiments on infants are still debated (see for example, 
Perner and Ruffman [32] for the criticism of Onishi and 
Baillargeon’s [29] study), evidence from studies on 
precursor abilities (see above refs.) of ToM seems to be 
convincing.  
  The above results imply that nonverbal ToM precedes 
verbal ToM developmentally and if so, nonverbal false-
belief tasks are easier than verbal ToM tasks. However, 
mixed results were obtained on this account. In several 
studies that compared children’s performance in verbal and 
nonverbal false-belief tasks, children performed better [33, 
34], the same [35, 36] or worse [37, 38] in the nonverbal 
false-belief tasks. For instance, in Call and Tomasello [36] 
the helper watched the experimenter hide a sticker in one 
location. When the helper left the room the experimenter 
moved the sticker from that location to another. Children 
were asked which box the helper might indicate as 
containing the sticker. In this experiment, both verbal and 
nonverbal conditions were acted out with no verbal 
description, but only the test question in the verbal version 
was verbal. Children’s performances in the two versions 
were comparable. Later, Lunn [33] tested children with the 
same task as Call and Tomasello and this time children 
performed better in the nonverbal task than the verbal one. 
Given these results, evidence in support of the linguistic 
determinism hypothesis is equivocal at best. As several ToM 
researchers suggest [16, 39], language may be important for 
ToM not because language is a prerequisite for ToM but 
because it is used as “scaffolding” for symbolic 
representations.  
Evidence from English Speaking Children 
  While implicit nonverbal ToM may not involve any 
language, there is relatively little doubt that language is 
involved in explicit verbal ToM, especially in the false-belief 
reasoning [40]. However, the extent of the involvement and 
what aspects of language are the most involved are much in 
debate. As I mentioned in the introduction, the strong 
linguistic determinism of ToM posits that language is 
prerequisite for ToM (e.g., [17]). De Villiers and her 
colleagues argue that children’s mastery of syntax, especially 
the sentential complement (e.g., “Sally says that…”) is 
necessary for ToM development. In this view, other aspects 
of language (i.e., lexicon, semantics, and pragmatics) are 
marginalized. More recently, P. de Villiers [41] has 
elaborated this hypothesis and argued that the mastery of 
sentential false-complements with communicative verbs 
plays a central role for explicit ToM reasoning. However, 
most of the evidence that supports this claim came from their 
own groups’ research (e.g., [17, 37, 41]). For instance, in 
their studies of oral deaf children and ASL-learning deaf 
children, children’s performance of the complement 
comprehension task predicted their performance on both 
standard and low-verbal false-belief tests (40). However, a 
close examination of the results of this study shows that 
children’s mastery of vocabulary (p = .005), and not the false 
complement clauses (p = .039) is a stronger independent 
predictor of their false-belief performance. Given these 
results, it seems unreasonable to maintain that the mastery of 
false-complement is the best predictor of false-belief 
reasoning. Moreover, in Lohmann and Tomasello [42], 
training children with discourse without sentential 
complements improved their false-belief task performance. 
Furthermore, a recent meta-analysis of over a hundred of 
studies that explored the relationship between language and 
ToM have demonstrated that various aspects of language 
(i.e., semantics, syntax, receptive vocabulary memory for 
complements, and general language) all predict ToM 
reasoning [18].  
Evidence from Non-ENGLISH Speaking Children: 
Second Version of Linguistic Determinism 
  The evidence described above seems to increasingly 
support that the strong linguistic determinism is untenable. 
However, fortunately there is another moderate version of 
linguistic determinism that emphasizes the influence of the 
socio-linguistic effects on ToM [43-46]. It follows 
Vygotsky’s theory [47] and posit that it is the social-
cognitive ability embedded in culture-specific symbolic 
systems (i.e., social languages) that enables children’s ToM. 
Its emphasis is not on constitutive aspects (e.g., syntax and 
semantics) but socio-communicative or pragmatic aspects of 
language [43, 46]. Bruner regards culture-specific meaning-
making process as a central force for development of ToM or 
folk psychology [43]. Similarly, Nelson posits that ToM is 
best described as a Community of Minds that is enabled 
through internalization of language [46]. The Community of 
Minds is not universal and each person develops his / her 
own Community of Minds depending upon his / her 
background, personality, relationships, and history. 
Intuitively, the pragmatic aspects of language are strongly 
associated with ToM because pragmatics assumes that both 
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context-specific intentions [48, 49]. In support of this 
hypothesis, it has been found that individuals with ASD are 
most impaired in the pragmatic aspect of the language 
[19,50]. It has also been suggested that the way in which 
older children / adolescents with ASD approach false-belief 
tasks is different from typically developing children in that 
they rely on syntax and semantics more than pragmatics 
which seems to be lacking in people with ASD [51]. The 
lack of pragmatics, and therefore, lack of ToM is evident in 
children with autism in their learning style of novel words. 
Baron-Cohen and his colleagues found that children with 
ASD learned new words whenever they themselves attended 
to the focal object whether or not the adult also attended to 
it, but the normally developing preschool children did not 
learn the new words unless the object was jointly attended to 
by another person [52].  
 Unfortunately,  Milligan  et al.’s meta-analysis [18] 
excluded those studies that examined the relationship 
between pragmatic aspects of language and those that tested 
non-English speaking children. An earlier meta-analysis that 
examined over a hundred ToM studies (including studies that 
tested non-English speakers) found that the basic course of 
development is the same across different language systems 
[4]. Children across different language systems passed false-
belief tasks between 2.5 and 5 years of age. However, since 
many of the studies included in the meta-analysis did not 
examine the relationship between language and ToM and 
since most of these studies tested children in English 
speaking countries, the meta-analysis is relatively 
uninformative in terms of the possible effects of the 
linguistic variation on ToM. More recently, Collaghan et al. 
[53] tested children in Canada, India, Peru, Thai, and Samoa 
with a single false-belief task and found no difference among 
these children in the passing age of the task. However, the 
same limitation as the above Wellman et al.’s study [4] 
applies here. Since this study did not use any specific 
language measures pitted against ToM measure, little 
information is provided on the relationship between 
language and ToM development.  
  Fortunately, there are a number of studies that tested non-
English speaking children with specific linguistic measures / 
hypotheses. Several of these studies found effects of 
language on ToM development (e.g., [54-56]). For instance, 
Junin Quechua children performed poorly on ToM tasks 
relative to American / European (A/E) children presumably 
because of their lack of mental state verbs [54]. In Lee                 
et al.’s study with Mandarin-speaking children, even though 
the children’s performance for the false-belief task was 
comparable overall to A/E children’s performance, their 
performance was influenced by the choice of verbs (i.e., 
three verbs that all mean “think”) used in the false-belief task 
[55]. Mandarin-speaking children performed significantly 
better when yiwei and dang, which connote that the belief 
referred to may be false, were used than when xiang (the 
more neutral verb) was used. In a study in Turkish and 
Puerto Rican (PR) Spanish-speaking children, advancement 
in ToM performance was found [56]. In this study, the 
Turkish or PR Spanish-speaking children, who have either a 
specific verb (Turkish) or a case marker (PR Spanish) 
available to make the false-belief mental state more explicit, 
performed better than Brazilian Portuguese or English-
speaking children who do not have those lexicons.  
  As I mentioned earlier, linguistic determinism theory 
posits that children’s successful mastery of complements is 
necessary for successful performance in the false-belief task 
[17]. However, it has been found that English-speaking 
children pass the false-desire task significantly earlier than 
they pass false-belief tasks (e.g., [57, 58]). To this, P. De 
Villiers explains that the false-desire task is easier for 
children because it takes the to+complement (e.g., “X want 
to…”), while false-belief task is harder because it takes the 
that+complement (e.g., “X believe that…”) [41]. If this 
claim is true, German-speaking children should perform 
equally well in the false-desire and false-belief tasks because 
in German the desire verb, wollen (want) also takes the 
that+complement form. However, a study found that it is not 
the case [59]. German-speaking children still performed 
better in false-desire (using “want” verb) task than the false-
belief (using “believe” verb) task. More importantly, in this 
experiment, no correlation was found between children’s use 
of that+complement and their performance in the false-belief 
task after verbal IQ and age were accounted for. Similarly, 
Cheung  et al. [60] examined whether or not Cantonese 
children’s mastery of syntactic aspects of language (more 
specifically, false-complements) uniquely predicts the 
children’s false-belief understanding. Contrary to this 
hypothesis, neither syntax nor verb semantics but children’s 
general language ability (measured by TELD-3 [61]) was the 
best predictor of ToM performance.  
  More recently, my dissertation research compared 8-12 
year-old Japanese bilingual children’s understanding of the 
second-order false-belief (i.e., “Sally thinks that Anne thinks 
that …”) presented in the first language (L1, Japanese) and 
the second language (L2, English) as a part of the functional 
brain imaging study ([25], see also [62]). Most linguists 
agree that in general, center-embedded sentences (those that 
have relative clauses placed in the middle) are harder to 
parse [63, 64]. The center-embedding problem is the most 
relevant to Japanese false-belief sentence processing, 
because a Japanese false-belief sentence normally has a 
center-embedded structure. For example, a typical English 
false-belief sentence is written as: 
Anne thinks [that the cake tastes good]  
   S       V     CP  
But the same sentence in Japanese is written as: 
Anne wa [sono ke-ki ga oishii-to] omou 
(Anne     [that the cake tastes good] thinks) 
    S          CP          V 
  As can be noticed easily, in the Japanese false-belief 
sentence, the complement phrase (CP) is placed between the 
noun and the verb of the sentence. In the English false-belief 
sentence, the truth value of the whole sentence can be 
inferred from the verb (V) placed right after the subject (S), 
but in the Japanese false-belief sentence, to determine 
whether or not the whole sentence is true, one has to wait 
until the end of the sentence. In the second-order false-belief 
sentence, the problem becomes worse because of the double 
center-embedding. For examine, when the above sentence is 
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Anne wa [Sally ga{sono ke-ki ga oishii-to} omotteiru to] 
omotteiru 
(Anne [Sally {that the cake tastes good} thinks that] thinks) 
    S1      S2           CP-that1             V2    CP-that2 V1  
  Thus, my prediction was that if the false-complement 
structure influences the false-belief understanding Japanese 
children (who were all balanced bilinguals) would perform 
worse in the same second-order false-belief task in Japanese 
(L1) than in English (L2). Contrary to this prediction, there 
was no effect of language. Japanese children’s performance 
on the Japanese false-belief task was comparable to their 
performance on the English false-belief task. These results 
are consistent with the most recent study that tested Japanese 
children with the second-order false-belief task [65]. In this 
study, despite the significant developmental delay in the 
first-order false-belief task (see also [66, 67]), Japanese 
children’s onset of the second-order false-belief task was 
about the same as the A / E children’s (i.e., between 6 and 9 
years old [68, 69]). These results clearly show that mastery 
of that+complement is not necessary for ToM understanding 
at least in several non-English speaking cultures.  
  In sum, the above evidence suggests that although it is 
undeniable that language ability is necessary for developing 
explicit ToM because it provides scaffolding to think and 
interpret other people’s intentions and actions, language may 
not be sufficient for the expression of ToM. Moreover, it 
may not be the syntactic or semantic aspects of language that 
is the most important for ToM. Contrary to the strong 
linguistic determinism, the currently available data suggest 
that it is pragmatic aspects of language that is the most 
essential for ToM development. Thus, evidence so far 
supports the second moderate version of linguistic 
determinism. 
EVIDENCE FROM NEUROLOGICAL STUDIES  
Evidence from Lesion Studies in Adults 
  Compared to behavioral or developmental evidence, 
neurological evidence to support or negate the 
developmental relationship between language and ToM is 
still scarce. However, evidence from developmental ToM 
studies described above suggests that pragmatic aspects of 
language are the greatest importance for ToM expression. It 
has been established that in human adults syntactic and 
semantic aspects of language are specialized in the left 
hemisphere of the brain (e.g., [70, 71]), while pragmatic 
aspects of language are specialized in the right hemisphere of 
the brain (e.g., [72, 73]). For instance, in Winner and 
Gardner’s study, RHD patients have been observed to 
choose a literal translation for a metaphorical sentence more 
frequently than healthy controls [74]. Several studies clearly 
showed that right hemisphere damaged (RHD) patients have 
problems with understanding non-literal language, 
metaphors, and jokes while they have no trouble in 
understanding literal language (e.g., [72, 75]). It has been 
found that left hemisphere damage (LHD) patients often 
perform as well as healthy controls in ToM tasks [21, 76-78], 
while RHD patients perform worse than LHD patients [79]. 
For example, Siegal et al. [79] tested both RHD and LHD 
patients with the standard Sally-Anne style false-belief task. 
RHD patients failed, whereas LHD patients passed the test. 
Similarly, in a lesion study, a LHD patient, PH, performed 
almost perfectly on nonverbal second-order false belief task, 
while he failed grammatical language tests [80]. Most 
recently, Champagne-Lavau and Joanette [81] observed a co-
occurrence of ToM impairment and deficit in pragmatic 
language in a group of 15 RHD patients. These results from 
lesion studies are consistent with the findings from 
behavioral studies and suggest that constitutive aspects of 
language or at least grammar are less important for ToM 
than pragmatic aspects of language. 
Evidence from Brain Imaging Studies in Adults 
  Lesion studies are, although informative, less specific 
about the brain areas involved in the aspects of language and 
their relationship to ToM. In order to determine precisely 
which brain regions are important for explicit ToM and 
language, researchers most commonly rely on data from 
brain imaging studies. The classical language regions 
encompass Broca’s area or Brodmann area (BA) 44/45 in the 
inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), Wernicke’s area in the superior 
temporal gyrus (STG), the angular gyrus, and supramarginal 
gyrus (SMG) [82]. There is now a broad consensus that 
syntactic processes are subserved by the left STG and the 
IFG (specifically, BA 44 and frontal operculum) in adults 
[70, 71, 83]. Semantic processes, in contrast, are found to be 
supported by the left middle temporal gyrus, the SMG, and 
BA 45/47 in the IFG in adults [84, 85].  
  Brain imaging studies that examined relationship 
between language and ToM are still scarce, but an fMRI 
study found that adults employ medial prefrontal cortex 
(mPFC), which has been the most consistently implicated in 
ToM brain imaging studies across studies [23], for 
processing pragmatically coherent stories [22]. More 
recently, my colleagues and I tested Japanese-English 
bilinguals with a second-order false-belief task (see above), 
using fMRI ([24], see also [62] for example stimuli and 
methods). During L1 (Japanese) compared to L2 (English) 
ToM story condition, more activity in the bilateral 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) was seen. During L2 
(English) compared to L1 (Japanese) ToM story condition, 
more activity in the left precentral gyrus and caudate nucleus 
was found. Since these two story conditions were matched in 
semantics and syntactic difficulty (see above), these 
differences in brain activity are most likely accounted for by 
pragmatic difference between Japanese and English. 
Difference in brain activity was also seen while Japanese and 
American participants performed the same nonverbal cartoon 
ToM task which was also in the second-order false-belief 
format. During the cartoon task, compared to Japanese 
adults, American adults activated the left postcentral gyrus, 
right mPFC, posterior cingulate cortex, and anterior 
cingulate cortex. Compared to American adults, Japanese 
adults activated the right putamen more [see [62] for more 
detailed results].   
  Compared to those in adults, brain imaging studies of 
language in children are still too scarce to reach a broad 
agreement on the specialization of those linguistic processes 
in the different areas of the brain. But increasing evidence 
suggests that language is less lateralized and involves 
broader regions in children than in adults [86]. In contrast to 
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studies in adults those in children are still numbered, but 
several studies examined neural basis of ToM or related 
social cognitive functions in children [25,88-93]. However, 
in many of the studies, ToM (or related social cognition) task 
specific activity in the aforementioned language regions has 
been observed (for detailed discussion see [94]). For 
example, significant activity in the IFG was found while 
children were engaged in facial imitation [89], story and 
cartoon-based irony [90, 91] and ToM tasks [25, 93]. So far, 
our study is the only brain imaging study that has compared 
adults and children in false-belief task related neural activity 
and we found difference in false-belief specific activity 
between the age groups in some of the language areas (see 
above) including the right IFG (BA 47) and left STG (BA 
62). Children activated these regions more than adults [94]. 
Furthermore, we found similar differences in ToM-specific 
brain activity between 8-12 year-old Japanese and American 
children [25] to those between Japanese and American adult 
[24]. In this experiment [25], American children activated 
the right TPJ more than Japanese children who activated the 
left STS and right IFG more while they performed the same 
cartoon based ToM task, although the significance levels 
were less (p-values were more) than what are normally 
expected in fMRI experiments in general. What pragmatic 
aspects between the two groups account for the differential 
brain activity remains to be tested, but it has been observed 
that Japanese use indirect expression more than Americans 
to inform everyday communicative intentions [95, 96]. Also, 
a recent study found that Japanese children’s justifications of 
protagonists’ behaviors in ToM stories are less agent-
centered and more interpersonal situation-centered than 
American children’s [67]. Thus, any of these or other 
pragmatic / communicative differences might account for the 
above difference in the brain activity between the two 
cultural groups.  
  Through a further analysis, we found the most 
convergence of ToM-specific activity (measured by ToM vs 
non-ToM conditions) between the Japanese and American 
adult and child groups in the right DLPFC (besides 
precuneus) for both verbal (story) and nonverbal (cartoon) 
versions of the task (Fig. 1; see also [62]), although in this 
analysis the bilateral tempro-parietal junction (TPJ) was also 
active, with the right TPJ being slightly more active than the 
left TPJ. Besides the mPFC, the TPJ has been implicated 
also most consistently across ToM brain imaging studies 
(e.g., [97]). These results, together with Saxe and Wexler’s 
results [97] which implicate the right TPJ specifically in 
mental state reasoning, indicate that the right-hemisphere 
pragmatic region of the brain plays a more important role for 
ToM than the left-hemisphere constitutive language region. 
  In sum, evidence from both brain lesion studies and 
neuroimaging studies of ToM has begun to converge to 
support the right hemisphere-pragmatics hypothesis of ToM. 
These results are again consistent with the account that 
pragmatic (not constitutive) aspects of language are 
necessary for the explicit ToM understanding. 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
  Several limitations of current research (both behavioral 
and neuroimaging) of relationship between ToM and 
language should be mentioned. One clear limitation is the 
paucity of neurological research that examined this 
relationship overall. Brain lesion studies are limited in that it 
is relatively rare to find individuals with localized brain 
lesions. For instance, RHD patients more often have lesions 
that encompass broad areas of the right hemisphere (see 
[99]). Thus it is difficult to examine more precise roles of 
particular areas of the brain. For these reasons more brain 
imaging research may be needed for drawing one-to-one 
correspondences between the target brain areas and ToM 
reasoning.  
  Another major limitation is the scarcity of developmental 
neuroimaging research of ToM. As I discussed above, 
several brain imaging studies that tested children with ToM 
or social cognition tasks implicated several language regions 
of the brain [25, 88-93]. These results clearly indicate that 
some aspects of language are involved in ToM development. 
However, it is still unclear if pragmatic aspects of the 
language are the most important for ToM developmentally. 
In our study, the left IFG (BA 45) was recruited more while 
children performed the ToM cartoon task, but the same 
region was recruited by adults more while the adults 
performed the ToM story task [92]. Since BA 45 is 
traditionally suggested to be involved in syntactic processing 
[82], more activation in this area may reflect children’s 
greater effort of constructing verbal meaning / syntax from 
nonverbal ToM. This results may be consistent with the 
finding that nonverbal false-belief tasks are not easier (or 
more difficult) than verbal false-belief task [35]. Given these 
results it may still be arguable that some constitutive aspects 
of language are necessary for ToM development. But to 
confirm these results and to examine the developmental 
relationship between the neural basis of language and ToM 
more neuroimaging research in children is needed. 
  Another clear limitation of research examining the 
relationship between ToM and language is related to a ToM 
theory called “theory-theory”. This theory maintains that 
ToM develops as scientists develop their theories and that 
ToM develops as children learn concepts of “desire” 
followed by concept of “belief” shortly after that [4]. 
Aforementioned meta-analysis by Wellman et al. [4] and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. (1) Convergence of ToM-specific brain activity between 
American and Japanese adult and child (ages between 8 and 12 
years old) groups. Convergent activity was found in the precuneus 
(x y z Talairach coordinate [98]: -4 -60 38), right dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC: 34 34 20), and bilateral tempro-parietal 
junction (TPJ: 53 -67 11 and -51 -53 19) through ToM minus non-
ToM contrast (p < .0005 uncorrected: see also [62]). 42    The Open Neuroimaging Journal, 2010, Volume 4  C. Kobayashi Frank 
more recent study by Liu et al. [100] in Chinese speaking 
children in mainland China, Hong Kong, the United States, 
and Canada supported this theory by finding that even 
though onsets of ToM expression vary, children’s 
developmental trajectory of ToM was the same across 
cultures and language systems. The authors concluded that 
across cultures children develop desire-based ToM first 
followed by belief-based ToM understanding. However, 
since semantic and pragmatic aspects of language have so 
much to do with concept creation, it is difficult to tease apart 
concept-making from pragmatics. It may be that the 
universal developmental trajectory (found in [4] and [100]) 
represents more pragmatic development than conceptual 
development. Furthermore, since pragmatics is strongly tied 
to culture [43], it is inevitable that ToM research should take 
into account cultural variables. However, as Vinden [101] 
and Lillard [102, 103] pointed out, the standard false-belief 
task may not be valid for all cultures because many non- A/E 
cultures do not construe behaviors as personal and 
intentional. As I discussed above, Naito and Koyama [67] 
have shown that many Japanese children rarely give 
intentional desire based explanation to account for the false-
belief of the protagonist. These results (together with 
Vinden’s results [101]) call into question the applicability of 
the developmental order of ToM concepts – from desire-
based understanding to belief-based understanding. But to 
verity these issues and to separate conceptual development 
from pragmatic development, more cross-cultural / linguistic 
behavioral and neurological studies that compare among 
different conceptual and pragmatic development specific to 
the cultures and language systems are needed.  
  Final limitation is that even though this review is about 
relationship between ToM and language, ToM may also 
involve other cognitive and / or affective faculties. It has 
been hypothesized that explicit expression of ToM requires 
not only language but also executive function [104-106]. For 
instance, Samson and Apperly and their colleagues 
[107,108] tested a brain damaged patient, WBA, with a 
nonverbal Sally-Anne style false-belief task adopted from 
Call and Tomasello [36]. This task also differed from the 
conventional false-belief task in that the real location where 
the focal object was hidden was not revealed to the 
participants. In other words, the executive demand (to inhibit 
one’s own knowledge) was kept low. WBA performed above 
chance on this task despite failing the standard false-belief 
task. A criticism of their study, however, is that the adult 
characters in their false-belief movie task might have 
introduced deceptive cues for the object location [99]. These 
criticisms aside, Samson et al.’s study is moving in the right 
direction. In order to discriminate the different factors that 
might affect ToM and to find the core component of ToM 
[99], to develop a ToM paradigm that has lower demands in 
executive function and language is a much needed task for 
the future research of ToM.  
  Related to the above point, a few recent studies found 
more activation in the right TPJ when subjects reoriented 
their attention to any new stimuli indiscriminately relative to 
the baselines [109,110]. These results challenged the 
hypothesis that the right TPJ is selectively involved in ToM 
reasoning (see [97]). These results, however, have been 
contested by a more recent study that found only a small 
overlap between ToM-specific and attention-specific 
activations in the right TPJ [111]. These conflicting findings 
of the brain imaging studies aside, it has been demonstrated 
that attention (in the form of joint-attention) plays a critical 
precursor role in early word learning and referential 
communication [112-114] and ToM development [115]. 
Taken together, these results are consistent with Malle’s co-
evolution hypothesis of ToM and language [13]; i.e., implicit 
ToM (e.g., referential communication and joint-attention) 
may precede language in evolution and development, but as 
children master language around 7 or 8 years old, language 
begins to exert greater effects on ToM. However, in order to 
delineate the precise developmental and evolutional 
sequence and relationship among language, attention, and 
ToM capacities and their neural correlates more neurological 
research in infants and non-human primates are needed.  
CONCLUSIONS  
  In this review I have discussed research on the 
relationship between ToM and language. Both behavioral 
and brain imaging research have begun to show evidence 
that there is moderate influence of language on ToM. 
Moreover, results of the studies discussed in this review 
suggest that pragmatic aspects of language affect ToM more 
than constitutive aspects. Since pragmatics and concept 
formation are tied to specific cultures, an important task of 
future ToM neuroimaging research is to define precisely 
what pragmatic / cultural factors are affecting ToM and 
examine these factors in systematic ways. The main stream 
theories of ToM all predict a culturally invariant core 
biological basis of ToM at least during early years in life 
(see [116]). Thus, another important task of cross-linguistic / 
cultural ToM brain imaging research is to find the core 
neural basis that remains relatively free from cultural and 
linguistic influence.  
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